We find that individual investors tend to trade in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch of their broker. Individual investors' tendency to herd within the same broker branch is persistent and negatively associated with their cognitive abilities and trading experience. The higher the herding tendency of an individual investor, the worse she performs in her investments. Importantly, the negative association between herding and investment performance is driven by the orders that are traded in the same direction with other individual investors. Our results suggest that herding induces a direct cost for the individual investors.
Introduction
The phenomenon that investors tend to trade in the same direction with other investors, known as herding, has been shown in various financial markets.
1 However, despite the prevailing evidence on the institutional herding and its association with stock returns, studies on the herding tendency of individual investors are limited. The two exceptions are Feng and Seasholes (2004) and Dorn, Huberman, and Semgueller (2008) . Feng and Seasholes (2004) show that individual purchases and sales in the same city tend to be positively correlated.
They attribute this herding behavior to information asymmetry because individual investors who live near a firm's headquarters react similarly to new public information. Dorn, Huberman, and Semgueller (2008) show that the trades of clients of a German broker tend to be on the same side of the market, and the correlated trades predict the cross-section of stock returns.
Our paper contributes to the literature by investigating the correlation between herding tendency and investment performance at the investor level. Specifically, we test the following Next, we examine whether the herd behavior is related to other investor traits.
Specifically, if the herd behavior stems from lack of information gathering or processing ability, we would expect that investors with lower cognitive ability or less trading experience are more likely to herd. Following Kuo, Lin, Zhao (2014) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) , we use the proportion of limit orders submitted at round number prices and the number of conducted trades to proxy for cognitive ability and trading experience, respectively. We find that both the cognitive ability and the trading experience are negatively associated with an individual investor's tendency to herd with other individual investors in the same broker branch. Individual investors with lower cognitive abilities and less trading experience tend to herd more. In addition, the result also suggests that herding tendency is persistent. However, individual investors could learn to mitigate their subsequent herd behavior.
Having established the herd behavior and its link with other investor traits, we then investigate whether herding is associated with investment performance. The intuition is that if the herd behavior among individual investors within the same broker branch is a reflection of lacking information gathering and processing capabilities or receiving the same inaccurate information, we would observe that the higher herding tendency of an investor, the poorer her investment performance.
Our results support the hypothesis that an individual investor's tendency to herd is negatively associated with her investment performance. When we sort investors into quintiles based on the herding measure in the previous year, we find that the fifth quintile investors (more inclined to herding) have lower mark-to-market intraday, 1-day, and 5-day returns in the subsequent year, compared with the first quintile counterparts. We draw a similar conclusion in multivariate regressions after controlling for cognitive ability, trading experience, past performance, disposition effect, the tendency to herd with other individual investors in the same broker (but not in the same branch), and the tendency to herd with other individual investors in the market (but not in the same broker). Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the herding measure (0.191) leads to a decrease of 0.67 basis points in the mark-to-market intraday return. The results also hold for the mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns. Importantly, this loss is not due to excessive trading of individual investors, as is documented in Barber and Odean (2000) and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009) . On the contrary, we find that individual investors who have higher herding tendency trade less than those who have lower herding tendency.
We propose two explanations for the negative association between herding and investment performance. The first explanation is that if an individual investor herds because she wants to save the search cost of information or because she finds it more reassuring to trade in the same direction with others, she pays a direct cost for the herding. This "costly herding" explanation implies that the documented poor performance of herding investors is only driven by the orders that are in the same direction of other individual investors in the same branch (herding orders). The other explanation is that the herding behavior is a reflection of lack of financial sophistication which can be related to information processing and gathering ability. If this is the case, this "lack of financial sophistication" explanation implies that the herding investors would underperform for both their herding and non-herding orders.
Our results indicate that the negative association between the herding behavior and investment performance only appears for the herding orders. A one-standard-deviation increase in the trading correlation leads to a 0.92 basis points decrease in the mark-to-market intraday return for the herding orders of individual investors. The coefficients for non-herding orders are not significantly negative. This finding is supportive of the "costly herding" explanation and inconsistent with "lack of financial sophistication" explanation.
Our paper is closely related to Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008) . Based on the data from a large German brokerage firm, they show that correlated orders of individual investors predict subsequent returns. They argue the predictability comes from the executed limit orders being compensated for accommodating liquidity demands. In complement with their stock-level evidence, we investigate the association between correlated trading and investment performance at the investor level. Our paper is also related to Jiang and Verardo (2013) , who define the mutual fund herding as the tendency to follow past fund flows, and
show that the funds with higher herding tendency achieve lower future returns. Our paper differs from and complements their study by shedding light on the herd behavior and its effect on investment performance for individual investors.
Our research adds to the individual herding literature in the following dimensions. First, to our knowledge, we are the first paper to identify the association between individual herding behavior and investment performance at the investor level. Second, we propose two channels through which the herd behavior could be negatively associated with investment performance.
Our findings support the notion of costly herding that herding imposes a direct cost on individual investors as the underperformance is only driven by the orders traded in the same direction with other individual investors.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the quotes and trades, as well as the brokers and branches where investors trade in TAIFEX. Section 4 studies the herding behavior and its relation with other investor traits. The association between herding behavior and the investment performance and the two potential interpretations are examined in Section 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 7, we conclude. Feng and Seasholes (2004) show that the trades of individual investors in the same city tend to be positively correlated. They interpret this herding behavior as that investors living near a firm's headquarters react similarly to new public information. Dorn, Huberman, and Semgueller (2008) employ the trades of clients of one German broker, and show that they tend to be on the same side of the market.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Correlated Trading among Individual Investors
In complement with the two aforementioned papers, we examine the individual investors'
herding behavior within the same branch of a broker. An individual investor may have more social interactions with other individual investors trading in the same branch of her broker. If the individual investor relies on information obtained from the social interactions and connections, a possible outcome is that she tends to trade in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch. In this sense, our paper is also related to Hong, Kubic, and Stein (2005) , who find evidence that the fund managers are likely to hold similar portfolios with other fund managers in the same city.
2
Meanwhile, individual investors in the same branch may receive the same information, such as recommendations or newsletters from the branch financial advisors. This is similar to the information cascade argument in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) , who interpret the institutional herding behavior as that money managers react to the same exogenous signals.
We thus study the herd behavior among individual investors trading within a branch. An Nofsinger and Sias (1999) use the changes in institutional ownership to measure the herding behavior, and they find a positive correlation between institutional herding and the contemporaneous stock returns. Wylie (2005) shows that fund managers herd out of stocks with large positive excess-to-benchmark returns in the 12monthsbefore the herding period and into stocks with low excess returns in those periods. Dorn, Huberman, and Semgueller (2008) show that the trades of the clients of a German broker can predict the cross-section of stock returns.
Correlated Trading and Investment Performance among Individual Investors
One common feature of the above mentioned papers is that they focus on the relationship between herding and stock returns at the stock level. We fill the research gap by examining the correlation between herding and investment performance at the investor level. Our data enable us to investigate the heterogeneity among individual investors' tendency to herd, and how the herd behavior is related to their performance. Our study also adds to the literature on the underperformance of individual investors. 
Costly Herding V.S. Lack of Financial Sophistication
In this subsection, we propose two hypotheses to interpret the negative association between herding and investment performance. The first explanation is that if an individual investor herds because of the search cost or emotional gain, she pays a cost for the herding.
This "costly herding" hypothesis implies that the poor performance of herding investors is only driven by the herding orders. Orders that are traded in the opposite direction with other individual investors would not underperform.
The other hypothesis interprets the herding behavior as a reflection of lack of financial sophistication or literacy which is related to information gathering and processing ability. The "lack of financial sophistication" hypothesis implies that the herding investors are essentially less sophisticated such that they would underperform both for their herding and non-herding orders. 
Data Description
We make use of the contract submission and trading records in the Taiwan Futures 
Taiwan Index Futures Contract Submission and Execution
One important feature in Taiwan index futures trading is that a large proportion of the trades are conducted by individual investors. Table I When testing the investment performance and investor learning, we require that investors trade at least ten product-days in the two consecutive years to have a meaningful trading correlation. 5 After applying this requirement, we are left with 125 million trades, and 131,184
investor-year observations. Table II 
Descriptive Statistics of Brokers and Branches
Correlated Trading and Other Investor Traits
In this section we address the following questions: Do individual investors trade in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch? If so, is the herding behavior related to other investor traits?
Correlated Trading within a Branch
We employ the complete order submission records to calculate the daily net positions of an individual investor and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. The investor-level herding measure is the correlation of an individual investor's daily net positions with those of others in the same branch within a year. Our definition of daily net position is essentially the intended daily net position because the order submission only reflects the intention to herd with other investors, but may not necessarily be executed. Thus, the herding measure calculated using this definition of daily net position is the intention to herd.
The similar filter is adopted by Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2014) . 6 We adopt the intention-to-herd as our herding measure to take care of the fact that some investors may have herding intentions but failed to do so simply because their orders are not successfully executed.
We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position approach. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day; it takes the value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts; and it equals 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the average number of contracts submitted per day in the previous year.
Essentially, a positive dummy variable or a positive scaled net position indicates that the investor is on the long side for a product (TXF or MXF) within a day. The daily net position of other individual investors is calculated by aggregating the net positions of all other individual investors trading in the same branch.
We first perform a univariate analysis on the correlations of the daily net positions. Table   III We perform the following regression analysis to formally test the herding behavior.
where , , is investor i's daily net position on product j at day t. The products are TXF and MXF orders with the maturity of the spot month, the next calendar month, and
These orders, although failed to be executed, also reflect investors' inclination to herd with others. The results remain qualitatively the same if we use the executed trades to define daily net positions. 7 When calculating the net position of other individual investors in the same broker, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch. Similarly, when calculated the position of other investors in the market, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch and the same broker. Hence, the estimation of correlation is not mechanically affected by the variable construction. 
Correlated Trading and Related Investor Traits
For each year, the investor-level herding tendency measure is calculated as the correlation between an individual investor daily net position and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. This measure is constructed each year for each investor.
We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position approach. To make sure that investors have a meaningful trading correlation measure, we require that each investor must have at least ten product-day observations in two consecutive years. 8 8 Our analysis on the association between cognitive limitation and investment performance might potentially suffer from the effects of investor attrition (survivorship bias) shown in Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) . However, our argument is that individual investors who have higher tendency to herd would perform worse. Because investors with worse performance are most likely to stop trading, the remaining investors in our empirical analyses after data filtration should have relatively better investment performance. Hence, the investor attrition should bias against us finding the negative
We consider the following investor traits that may be related to the herding behavior. The first one is the past tendency towards herding. If herd behavior is an investor trait that can be carried over to different periods, we would expect that investors who herd more in the past are more subject to the herding behavior in the future. Second, we examine the effect of cognitive ability on the tendency to herd. The cognitive ability is measured in the same way as Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2014) , and it is calculated as the proportion of investor i's limit orders submitted at prices ending with "X0" in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9).The higher the ratio, the lower the cognitive ability.
The third factor is the trading experience, proxied by the number of contracts submitted. This is in the same vein as Feng and Seasholes (2005) . The fourth factor is the past performance, indicated by the average intraday limit order returns in the previous year. Finally, we look at the disposition effect, defined as the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades, scaled by the average of the two.
9 Odean (1998) shows that the tendency to hold losing investments for too long and sell winning investments too soon leads to lower after-tax returns. The disposition effect could be associated with the herding behavior if both of them are part of an investor's trait.
For each investor and each year, we calculate the investor-level herding tendency and the measures for other investor traits. We then perform the following regression:
= + 1 ℎ, , −1 + 2 0, , −1 + 3 ( , −1 )
where ℎ, , and ℎ, , −1 are the correlations between investor i's relationship between correlated trading and investment performance in the quintile analysis. In addition, we also check whether our results hold when we require investors to have at least 5 or 15 daily net position observations each year in the two consecutive years. The results hold that individual investors who herd more with other individual investors tend to have poorer investment performance. 9 We follow Jordan and Diltz (2003) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) to calculate round-trip trade performance. A round-trip trade is identified as a newly initiated position, long or short, being covered.
daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch in year t and t-1. 0, , −1 is the measure for cognitive limitation.
( , −1 ) is the log of number of contracts submitted by investor i in year t-1. , −1 is the average intraday return of limit orders in the previous year. , −1 is the difference between the previous year's duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. individual investors with more trading experience and better past performance are less subject to the herding behavior, while those who are more affected by the disposition effect tend to herd more.
In Table V we also reports the regression analysis of the difference between the herding tendencies in two consecutive years to take care of the time invariant factors of investors' characteristics. The results are consistent with the regression analysis of the herding tendency level. For example, the second column of Table V shows that individual investors with more trading experience and better past returns are more likely to reduce the tendency to herd in the future. This is consistent with the investor learning literature that trading experience helps investors to improve investment decisions (Feng and Seasholes, 2005 , Dhar and Zhu, 2006 , and Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman, 2010 .
Correlated Trading and Investment Performance
In this section, we combine the order submission records with the execution data, to investigate the link between the herd behavior and investment performance.
The Investor-level Correlated Trading
Our measure for the investor-level herding tendency is calculated as the correlation between an individual investor's daily net positions and those of other individual investors who trade in the same branch. This measure is constructed each year for each investor. We employ the dummy variable and the scaled net position approach to calculate the daily net position, similar to that in the previous section.
We then sort the individual investors into five groups according to the lagged trading correlation for our quintile analyses. Table VI Table VI shows that Q5 individual investors have trading correlations (defined using the dummy variable approach) of 0.369 and 0.165 for the two consecutive years, which are higher than the trading correlations of Q1 investors in both years.
As investors in a herding group are submitting their orders at the same direction within one trading day, these orders queue for longer time waiting to be executed, and their execution probability are also lower. This implies that for investors who exhibit more herd behavior, their orders face more competition to be executed. Table VI shows that Q5 individual investors have significant lower execution ratios and longer time-to-execution for their limit orders than those of Q1 individual investors. These results indicate that there are more frictions for orders to be executed when investors herd.
Trading Correlation and Investment Performance
The investment performance is measured as the mark-to-market return of all orders which initiate a long or short position. 10 Following Bhattacharya et al. (2012), we calculate the intraday return using the difference between the daily closing price and the initiating order's execution price, divided by the execution price. This calculation assumes that the initiating orders are covered (closed-out) at the closing price of the trading day. We first calculate the average intraday return weighted by the number of contracts for each investor-year observation. The returns are then averaged up with equal weights for all of the investor-year observations in each quintile. For robustness, we also calculate 1-day and 5-day mark-to-market returns, which employ closing prices of t+1 and t+5, respectively. Figure 1 plots the mark-to-market returns against the quintile ranks of investors based on their previous year's herding measure. We find that intraday returns almost monotonically decrease with the trading correlations. Similar patterns also exist for 1-day and 5-day returns.
This pattern provides convincing evidence that the herding tendency and investment performance are negatively correlated for individual investors. basis points within a trading day. The inferior performance of the Q5 investors continues to deteriorate, and the gap widens to 5.7 basis points for the 5-day mark-to-market returns.
Similar results can be found using the scaled net position approach to define the herding behavior. 10 We only use initiating orders to evaluate the mark-to-market returns because the sum of mark-to-market returns for an initiating order and that for a closing order do not necessarily reflect the true performance of a round-trip trade. If the initiating and closing orders are executed on two different days, we are essentially using two different daily closing prices to calculate the returns. Hence, the sum of the two returns is an inaccurate calculation of the investor's performance. 
where , is the average mark-to-market returns for investor i at year t. it is calculated as the proportion of investor i's limit orders submitted at "X0" price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). ( , −1 ) is the logged number of limit orders submitted by an investor in year t-1, which is a proxy for her trading experience. , −1 is the average mark-to-market intraday returns in the previous year.
, −1 is the difference between theprevious year's duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. Controlling for the cognitive limitation, trading experience, past performance, and disposition effect helps us to single out the effect of herding on investment performance. We also control for the tendency to herd with other investors in the same broker and the tendency to herd with other investors in the market. Notice that the parameter estimates of 0, , −1 are significantly negative, implying that investors with lower cognitive ability have poorer performance. This is consistent with the findings in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2014) . Past intraday return is positively associated with the subsequent returns, indicating that the investment performance is persistent over time. Besides, the coefficients for , −1 are all significantly negative, suggesting that the disposition effect is negatively associated with investment performance. This is consistent with the findings in Odean (1998).
Costly Herding or Lack of Financial Sophistication?
We test the two explanations for the negative association between individual herding and investment performance. The "costly herding" hypothesis predicts that the documented poor performance of herding investors is mainly driven by the herding orders. The "lack of financial sophistication" hypothesis indicates that individual investors with higher herding tendency would underperform both when their orders are submitted at the same direction with others and when they trade against the crowd.
We first perform a quintile analysis. We sort investors into quintiles based on their herding tendency in one year, and look at the performance of herding and non-herding orders in the subsequent year. The herding orders are defined as the orders that are traded in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch. The non-herding orders are those that are in the opposite direction with other individual investors. The average mark-to-market returns are calculated separately for the herding orders and the non-herding orders for each investor and each year. 
where , is the average mark-to-market returns for investor i at year t, and it is calculated separately for herding orders and non-herding orders. Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2014) , and it is calculated as the proportion of investor i's limit orders submitted at "X0" price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). ( , −1 ) is the log of number of contracts submitted in the previous year. , −1 is the average mark-to-market return in the previous year.
, −1 is the difference between the previous year's duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. We control for , , −1 and , , −1 , the tendency to trade in the same direction with other investors in the same broker (but not in the same branch) or in the market (but not in the same broker). Overall, our findings are supportive of the "costly herding" hypothesis that the poor performance of investors with high herding tendency is driven by their herding orders.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the individual herding behavior at the investor level. We find that individual investors tend to trade in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch. We construct an investor-level herding tendency measure, and find that the past herding behavior is a strong determinant for the current tendency to herd. Individual investors with lower cognitive abilities and lower trading experience tend to trade more in the same direction with other individual investors in the same branch.
We find a negative relationship between correlated trading and investment performance.
Individual investors with higher tendency to herd, defined by a higher trading correlation with other individual investors in the same branch, experience significantly lower intraday, 1-day, and 5-day returns. Further, the negative association between herding and investment performance is only driven by the herding orders. These results suggest that herding with other individuals in the same branch imposes a direct cost to individual investors. This table reports the correlated trading based on an investor's daily net position and the daily net position of other investors trading in the same branch, the same broker, or the market. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year. When calculating the net position of other investors in the same broker, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch. Similarly, when calculated the position of other investors in the market, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch and the same broker. is investor i's daily net position on product j at day t. The products are TXF and MXF orders with the maturity of the spot month, the next calendar month, and the next three quarterly months. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year.
ℎ, , is the daily net position of other individual investors in the same branch as investor i. We also control for the market return, the market volatility, and the daily net positions of institutional investors. When calculating the net position of other investors in the same broker, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch. Similarly, when calculated the position of other investors in the market, we exclude the contracts submitted in the same branch and the same broker. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 0.0553*** 0.0538*** 0.0412*** 0.0735*** 0.0734*** 0.0637*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Control variables Market return -2.5871*** -2.6501*** -2.3026*** -1.5631*** -1.5679*** -1.2365*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Market volatility -0.0072*** -0.0069*** -0.0067*** -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0050*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Intercept 0.0297*** 0.0282*** 0.0236*** 0.0247*** 0.0249*** 0.0194*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0. Where ℎ, , and ℎ, , −1 are the correlation between investor i's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch in year t and t-1. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year.
0, , −1 is the measure for cognitive limitation, and it is calculated as the proportion of investor i's limit orders submitted at "X0" price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). ( , −1 ) is the log of number of contracts submitted in the previous year.
, −1 is the average mark-to-market intraday returns in the previous year. , −1 is the difference between the previous year's duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Independent
Dummy Variable Approach Scaled Net Position Approach Variables -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
, −1 -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.026*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) In this table we sort investors into quintiles by the herding measure in one year, and report the descriptive statistics for the investor-year pair with two consecutive years. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more inclined to herding. The branch-level trading correlation is the correlation between an investor's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year. Execution ratio is the proportion of contracts executed for undeleted limit orders. Time-to-execute is the interval between the order submission time and the execution time for all executed limit order contracts. All items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. To ensure reasonable herding measures, we require that investors must submit at least product-days in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. In this table we sort investors into quintiles by the herding measure in one year, and report the mark-to-market returns for the investor-year pair in the subsequent year. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more inclined to herding. Herding with the branch is defined as the correlation between an investor's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year. Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in a similar fashion. All items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. To ensure reasonable herding measures, we require that investors must submit at least product-days in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. where , is the average mark-to-market returns for investor i at year t. ℎ, , −1 is the correlation between individual investor i's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch in year t-1. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year.
0, , −1 is the measure for cognitive limitation in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2014) , and it is calculated as the proportion of investor i's limit orders submitted at "X0" price points in the previous year (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). ( , −1 ) is the log of number of contracts submitted in the previous year.
, −1 is the average mark-to-market return in the previous year.
, −1 is the difference between the previous year's duration of losing and winning round-trips, divided by the average of the two. We control for , , −1 and , , −1 , the tendency to trade in the same direction with other individual investors of the same type trading in the same broker or in the market. When calculating the daily net positions of other investors in the same broker, we exclude the orders from the same branch. Similarly, when calculating the daily net position of other investors in the market, we exclude orders from the same branch and the same broker. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure reasonable herding measures, we require that investors must submit at least product-days in each of the two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
Dummy Variable Approach Scaled Net Position Approach Variables Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) Intraday (%) 1-day (%) 5-day (%) In this table we sort investors into quintiles by the herding measure in one year, and report the mark-to-market returns of herding and non-herding orders for the investor-year pair in the subsequent year. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more inclined to herding. Herding with the branch is defined as the correlation between an investor's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year. Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in a similar fashion. We calculate the returns separately for herding orders and non-herding orders. The herding orders are identified as the orders that are trading at the same direction as other investors in the same branch, while the non-herding orders are the orders that are trading in the opposite direction of to the other investors in the same branch. All items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. To ensure reasonable herding measures, we require that investors must submit at least product-days in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Figure 1. Correlated Trading and Mark-to-market Returns
In this table we sort individual investors into quintiles by the herding measure in one year, and report the descriptive statistics for the investor-year pair in the subsequent year. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more inclined to herding. Herding with the branch is defined as the correlation between an investor's daily net positions and those of other individual investors trading in the same branch. We employ two specifications for the daily net position: the dummy variable approach and the scaled net position. The daily net position dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an investor submitted more buy contracts relative to sell contracts within a day, takes value of -1 if an investor submitted more sell contracts, and 0 otherwise. The scaled net position is the difference between the number of buy contracts and the sell contracts, scaled by the daily average number of contracts submitted in the previous year. Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in a similar fashion. All items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged up in each quintile. To ensure reasonable herding measures, we require that investors must submit at least product-days in each of the two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
